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University of California, Los Angeles
POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING THE SURVIVABILITY
OF REGIONAL MARKET CENTERS
Seymour Smith
The Effect of Competitive Rateson Competition Among
Market Makers
Under current circumstances,Iwould expect the elimination of fixed
commissions on brokerage services to substantially reduce the volume of
trading done on regional stock exchanges and in the third market. I believe
that this will occur even ifa composite tape and a composite quotation
system are in effect at the time fully competitive rates go into effect.
If the volume of trading on these alternative marketplaces is sufficiently
depressed they may disappear or may survive in a substantially reduced
form, Some services they offer, such as clearing and bookkeeping, are
NOTEExtract of statement ifore the Securities and Exchange commission regarding prnposed rules
19b-3 and lob-fl, November 20, 1974.
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more likely to survive; but as trading locations,I expect thesemarkets vjIj suffer very hard times.
An important fact thatmuct he kept in mind in assessingthe probable impact of competitive rateson the regional exchanges and thethird market is that brokers do not ordinarilycheck alternativemarketplaces in deter.. mining where to execute orders.They may do this ifa knowlcdgeaJand valuable customer specificallyrequests it. But the averageindividual inves- tor can expect to have his orderexecuted in whatevermarket ismost convenient for his broker, providedthe execution thusobtained isnot expected to be grossly inadequate.
There are severalreasons for this practice. First, checking
alternative markets is costly. Thisis true even when thequotations of competitj market makersare available tothe broker throughacomputerized quotation system. Second, thecost of executing ordersdiffers fromone market to another. Otherthings being equal,a broker may preferto execute a transactionon an exchange where he has hisown floor broker, rather than pay floorbrokerage fees tosomeone else. Similarly,there may be differences inclearing,communications, and othercosts dependingon which market is used.Third, undercurrent practices, the brokeragecom- mission rate chargedto the customer is thesame whether the brokermakes an effort to obtain thebest execution for hiscustomer, or routinely forwards the orderto the market that ismost convenient for him.Fourth, many customers do not knowthat there are alternative
marketplaces and that betterexecution can sometimesbe obtained bycomparing prices in alternative markets. Fifth,many customers who do knowthat alternatives exist may not know howto use a tape andquotation system to determineif the broker isattempting to provide himwith best execution.Sixth, brokers believe that theirfailure to checkalternative marketsto obtain best execution will not subjectthem to civil damagesuits from privateindividu- als or tosanctions from the SECor any self-regulatoryagency. Since brokers donot routinely checkalternative marketsto obtain best execution for theircustomers a market maker
cannot necessarily attract more business by makingbetter markets.As a result, lithethird marketor one or more of theregional stockexchanges were todisappear after the introduction ofcompeitjve rates,one could notnecessarily conclude that it disappearedbecause itwas less efficient thanits competitors.In the present circumstancescompeting marketsmay disappeareven if they are more efficient thantheircompetitors
The public interestdoes notrequire preservingcompetitorsIt does, however,require conditions inwhich more efficientmarkets and market makers aremore likely to survive.Introducingcompetitive brokerage rates Is not sufficient toachieve this resultin thesecurities industry at thepresent time.The Policy Alternatives
One possibilitywould be to attempt to enforcea requirement that brokers
check all alternative marketc before executing a customer's order.A
disadvantage of this policy is that it would increase the Costs to brokersof
executing orders. These extra costs might Sometimes exceed the expected
benefit to the broker's customer. With competitive rates, these costs would
become incorporated in the rates charged to customers. Another problem
with this approach is that it is not clear to whom enforcement responsibil-
ity for such a rule should be assigned. None of the self-regulatory agencies
is a disinterested party,and the SEC is not flow ina position to enforce the
requirement itself. An advantage of this approach is that it would encour-
age moreeffective competition among market makers. Also,it might
provide some economic incentive which is now weak or wholly lacking
for the development of more efficient means of displaying quotations and
executing orders.
Another policy alternative would be to require that brokers fully disclose
to their customers the practices they follow with respect to checking
alternative markets. Can an agency founded ona philosophy of full
disclosure object to disclosing to investors the services their brokers are
providing for them? If full disclosure were required, brokers might give
their customers the choice of paying a higher brokerage commission rate to
get a chance of better execution or a lower rate with the order executed
wherever it was most convenient for the broker. Even if a disclosure policy
were adopted, it would be necessary to have some enforcement procedure
so that a customer could be reasonably sure he was getting the service he
was paying for.
A disadvantage of the disclosure policy is that it presumes the investor is
in a position to make an informed choice. This is not the case for most
individual investors.It would be interesting to know what the legal
responsibilities of a fiduciary would be in those circumstances
A third alternative would be to continue the current practices.That is,
individual investors have no assurance that their brokers are providing best
execution, but no effort is made to publicize this fact.Iwill not try to
defend this policy,if indeed a defense were possible.
Whichever of these three alternatives is adopted as a short-run expe-
dient, the long-run goal should cobtinue to be creation of anelectronic
communications system with trade-executing capabilities.Such a system
would permit effective competition between geographicallyseparated
market makers by exposing each of them to the entire flowof orders in the
system. At the same time the system woulddrastically reduce the costs







Such communicationssystems are technologicallypossible.However they cannot be imposedon a major group of marketparticipantsagainst their will. Elimination ofsubstantial elements ofmonopolypower among existing market makers isa necessary prerequisite to thecreation ofa communications system that willallow effectivecompetition between geographically separated marketmakers.
REGIONAL CENTERSIN A CENTRAL MARKETERA:
SOME OBSERVATIONS
Richard R. West
It has become particularlyapparent in recentyears that the forecastingof economic developmentsis a most hazardouspastime. This beingthe case, it is with significantreservations that Iput pen topaper in an attemptto speculate about theprobable viabilityof regionalcenters in acentral market system.
Although many differingopinions were expressedat the symposium,one common consensuswas that the building blocksof a marketsystem worthy of the title"central" must include:(1) a compositetape for reporting transactions and(2) a compositequotation system.In addition,most participants appearedto regard competitive
commission rates andsome form of interfacebetween retail andwholesale marketsegments asessen- tial ingredientsin the creationof a centralmarket. Finally,the participants most familiar withthe so-calledback-office operationsof the stockmarket evidenced aconviction thatan interface between
competing clearing houses anddepositories shouldbe an integralpart of a restructured marketplace.
In today's world,the phrases"regional center"and "regionalstock exchange"are synonymous.Thus, itseems relevant to askwhat might be expected to happento the regionalexchanges,as we now know them,in the processof creatinga central markethaving thecharacteristics de- scribed above.
Perhaps themost apparentconsequence of thisprocess would be the demise of theregional "floors."A central marketbuilt arounda computer tape and composite
quotations willnot be basedon geographic centrality, but ratheron electroniccentrality. Thebook will bekept in (by)a computer, and ordersultimately willflow to andfrom spaces incomputer memories. Sooneror later, the floors,posts, and all ofthe other trappings we now associatewith stockexchanges willbecome quaintanachronisms. (I might add,incidentally, thatthe soonerthey becomeanachronisms, the
Ibetter. The computercapability to create a central marketSystem already
existS, and itshould he implemented at the earliest possibletime.)
The disapPearance of floors and the likevill not necessarily beaccom-
panied by the demiseof the market makers whonow tread on them--at
least not all ofthese market makers. The good regional Specialistsshould
be able to surviveand prosper in a central market System. Thecomposite
quotation system will give them access to all of the order flowsomething
they now lack asregional specialists.If they can consistently make
competitive markets, they should have no trouble demonstrating that
capability (and thereby prospering) in such a system.
I must confess that prior to the symposium, I saw little reason to believe
anything other than that the better regional specialists would survive the
process of creating a central market. The discussion regarding clearing and
sefflements, however, opened my eyes to what may well be the most
important role of regional centers in the future. I am referring, of course, to
the possibility that innovative regional clearing and settlements systems
will be able to compete effectively within an interfaced national system.
In summary, then, it seems reasonable to predict that the viability of
regional centers will not be totally impaired in a central market system, but
the nature of these centers will be very different from what it is todayso
different, in fact, that it will little resemble that of today's regional stock
exchanges. As I mentioned at the outset, however, predicting economic
phenomena is a hazardous business;thus,Iwill not be particularly
surprised if what seems 'reasonabIe" today is quite different from what
takes place in the future.
THE VIABILITY OF STOCK EXCHANGES
Hans R. Stoll
In the Long Run
In the long run there is, in my view, little role for exchanges as we have
known them, be they the exchange located in New York City or the
exchanges located elsewhere in the country. Thisis the result of (1)
technological changes in communications and information storage that
make unnecessary the face-to-face contact on the floor of an exchange, (2)
the elimination of barriers and special privileges that have made exchanges
economically beneficial to their membership after the need fortraditional
exchange organizations had passed, and (3) the increasing role ofthe SEC
and nonexchange organizations (NASD) in certifying members, regulating
conduct, and maintaining the financial integrity of brokersand dealers.
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Securities markets have three functions: (1)they provide a comrnUnica
tions network through which investors (orbrokers acting on behalf of
investors) determine bid and asked prices atwhich trading is possible and
through which trades can be consummated, (2) they provide a Clearing and
record-keeping mechanism for exchanging ownership claims after a trans-
action has been agreed to, and (3) they usually provide a network of
dealers who stand ready to trade immediately for their own accounts when
investors cannot find other investors to trade with.
Consider first the role of exchanges in the communications system. A
perfect communications system is one in which all buyers are aware of the
asking prices of all sellers and all sellers are aware of the bid prices of all
buyers. Therefore, every buyer and seller can trade at the best price to him.
(Note that net prices may differ for two buyers because of differential
communications, bookkeeping, clearing, or other costs.) No communica-
tions system is perfect because there are prohibitive costs to such perfec-
tion. However, greater perfection than we now have is possible. In the long
run Ianticipate a system like the one outlined by Morris Mendelson that
consists of a national quotation system integrated with a single autornatJ
book (essentially a combination of NASDAQ and lnstinet) with the capabil-
ity of "locking in" transactions. This communications system will be like a
road system along which firms can locate according to their best business
judgment. Such a system may well lead to a geographical dispersion of
securities firms, butit creates no incentives to belong to one of the
exchanges, since individual firms can hook directly into the system.
Like the communications function, the function of exchanging owner-
ship claims can, to a large extent, be automated. This conference has made
clear how rapidly we are moving in that direction.In the long run,
securities would be immobilized and ownership claims and transactions
recorded and cleared at a central computerized facility in theway mutual
funds now report ownership and transactions to their shareholders. To the
extent that firms could join such a system directly (or through another firm)
exchanges would be unnecessary.
Dealers_-firms willing to quote two-sided markets for theirown account
and rusk-have needed exchanges because exchangeswere the conimuni-
cations system and, therefore, the source of business. When communica-
tions and clearing move outside the framework of existing exchanges,so
will dealers.I.ike brokers, they will beusers of these systems through
which they will provide a service for whichthey will be compensated. And
like brokers they will presumably besubject to competition from other
firms.
The effectiveness of the clearing andcommunications systems depends
on the degree of confidence in the financial integrityof firms using those
422 POS!S 1i1)tS hy Academic ParticipantsL
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systems. Customersmust have complete confidence in brokerage houses if
they are toleave shares in brokers' names. Brokers and dealers must have
complete confidencein other brokers and dealers with whom they trade.
Quotations aremeaningful onlyif one has confidence in the financial
integrity of thedealer making the quotation. Brokers and dealerscan
protect eachother by suitable deposit requirements (i.e., deposits at the
clearing associationwhich are 'marked to the market"). The public is
partly protected againstfirm failure by SIPC (Securities Investor Protection
Corporation). Although the regulation of financial integrity has largely been
assumed by the SEC, there would seem to be a role for exchanges in
raising levels of customerprotection above government minimums, that is,
exchanges could become associationsof firms that self-insure and guaran-
tee standardsof behavior above those set by government regulation. In
addition, exchanges could provide dicferent levels of training and certifica-
tion for salesmen.
Monopoly Versus Competition
There seemed to be general awareness atthe conference of the dangers of
moving to a national system of thekindI have just outlined. If there is a
single communications system and asingle clearing system, what incen-
tives for innovation exist andwhat protection is there against exorbitant
lees for the use of these systems?The best answer Ihave heard on this
problem was Morris Mendelson's suggestion thatthere be separate national
systems for different sets of securities.This is based on the assumption that
a natural monopoly existsin centralizing orders for a specific securityand
not necessarily in centralizing orders forall securities and that maximum
economies of scale are reached before all securities arein a single system.
Adoption of this suggestion implies thatbroad-based securities firms might
need several quotation terminals and would have tosettle transactions with
several clearing systems. This is no serious lossof economy since such
firms would probably have several traders, eachrequiring a terminal under
any circumstances; they would alsotend to have a sufficientback-office
volume and staff to justify dividing up the clearingand settlement function.
Separate national quotation and clearing systems mayalso give new life
to exchanges as the administrators ofthese separate systems. How se-
curities would be allocated among the systemsis a difficult problem.I
would suggest that corporations be allowed atthe beginning of each year
to choose the system on which they wishtheir stock to betraded.
Within each system, entry of brokers, dealers,and,Iwould argue,
individual arid institutional investors ought to be asfree as possible. In
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terms of the road system analogy, anyone who can afford acar (meeting
safety requirements) and the gas ought to be allowed touse the road.
Individuals or institutions that findit economic to bear theCosts of a
terminal and the line charges ought to be able to enter quotes fortheir owr
account. (Whether institutions or securities firms ought to be ableto act
both as principal and agent is an important separate issue.)Opportunity (or
entry is an important protection against poor service or high leesof brokers
and dealers in the system. There is a natural tendency forfirms initially in
the system to raise entry requirements that wouldopen the road only to
large operators. For example, it is likely that rules for dealersin theSystem
would impose capital requirements, require two-sidedquotes, requirea
commitment to make quotes for a specified periodf time, etc. Suchrules
have laudable objectives, but if quotations in thesystem may be supplied
only by firms meeting those rules, they have theeffect of excludingsmall
dealers, individuals, and institutions whomay be in the market only
periodically. This hurts those excluded and hurtsthe public by reducing
the number of quotations. It wouldnot be difficult to meet thoselaudable
objectives while at the same time allowingfree entry onto thequotation
screen. Financial integrity can be guaranteed by depositrequirements at
the time of trade, not by standingcapital requirements. Professionaldealers
and occasional traderscan be separately identified, and the sizeof trade
each trader is good for indicated.
Transition
My view of the longrun is a prediction, nota prescription. The markets
ought to have anopportunity not to reach the longrunI have outlined.
They should be permittedto adapt to new technologyand changing demands which none ofus may be able to anticipate. In thewords of
Commissioner Loomis, "thecentral market system isa process, not an institution."
This view implies thatprocedural issues should takeprecedence over
substantive issues. Thetone of the conference andthe position of the SEC (despite protestationsto the contrary) and theCongress suggest that the reverse is truethat the kindof system we get ismore important than the way in which we get there. Thus;there has been muchgreater emphasis on the substantive structureof the quotationsystem and the clearing system than on the eliminationof barriers to entry andof special privileges which have tendedto fix markets in theirpresent mold. By failing to remove existing restrictionswhile imposingnew ones, we are in danger of dictating asystem that mayprove inefficient.PostscriPts by AcadernPartwpants
SUMMARY COMMENTS
Robert K. Glauher
There was a time not so long ago when regional exchanges were relatively
sleepy places, where securities of local and regional interest were virtually
the only ones traded. But then during the 1960s and early I970s, several of
these exchanges were transformed into miniatures of the New York and
American stock exchanges, with tapes showing trades in a host of familiar
companies listed on the major exchanges. The primary reason for this
transformation was, of course, the stubborn support by themajor ex-
changes of fixed rnitlimum commissions in the face of increasing trading
activity by institutional investors and the consequent increase in the size
(and profitability) of the average trade. Seeking a means of recapturing part
of the profit derived from executing their trades, an increasing number of
institutions executed trades, either directly or indirectly, on regionalex-
changes. Indeed, quite a few of those institutions actually becamemem-
bers of certain regional exchanges.
The changing role of the regionals has had the effect of making their
economic viability increasingly dependent on the continuation of the fixed
minimum commission structure. Although much can happen before May
1,1975,it appears to most observers that fully negotiated rates will
eventually be a part of the brokerage industry's structureand sooner
more likely than later. The new economic environment will, quite obvi-
ously, confront the regional exchanges with important challenges to their
continued prosperity.
Where the bulk of trading wille done in this new commission rate
environment is most difficult to forecast. Without the artificial incentives to
divert trading to regional exchanges, a larger share of trades done on
traditional exchange floors is likely to flow back to the major exchanges,
with their greater liquidity. But the new central market environment is also
likely to spawn new competing market makers who trade electronically,
away from any traditional floor (as, for example, through NASDAQ). To
prosper, or perhaps just to survive, in this new environment, the regional
exchanges will have to provide services and facilities sufficient to stem the
natural flow of trades away from their floors. The clearing services
pioneered by the Midwest Exchange and the automated small-size (up to
199 shares) transaction system developed by the Pacific Exchange are
examples of what can be done, but the pressures on regionals are likely to
be most severe in thisnew, more competitive environment.Moreover, to
the extent that the services offered by the regionals aim at clearing
mechanisms rather than trading facilities,itis quite possible that these
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texchanges might survive in much altered formfor example, as regional
trade-clearing service centerc rather than trading floors.
Many impartial observers may conclude that the survival of regional
exchanges depends on competitive economics and is not an issue of great
public policy importancelet the chips (all where they may. Indeed, some
of the panelists at this conference argued that the government (i.e., the SEC
or the Justice Department) should not attempt to encourage the survival
artificially of the regionals. Although I am substantially in agreement with
this position, it leaves me a bit uneasy. There is at least one argument that
suggests that the survival of a healthy regional exchange network is
important to a well-functioning capital market and is therefore of very real
importance to public policy.
I suspect, although I have little direct evidence to support the conclu-
sion, that if regional exchanges go out of business there will be a decline jr
the number and vitality of regional securities market centers and their
attendant populations of regional securities firms. While a number of
well-managed and effective regional brokerage houses do exist in cities
without important regional exchanges, I suspect such exchanges give focus
to the local financial community and without these exchanges, such
financial communities would wither considerably.
The continued existence of a large number of healthy, geographically
dispersed regional brokers may or may not have much effect on the quality
of transactions in the market for securities already issued, but it is likelyto
have important effects on the system that distributesnew securities for
companies that want to raise additional capital. The threat to thesystem
that distributes new securities is not only that it will shrink in overallsize as
negotiated rates continue to force inefficient and marginally effective
brokers to merge or go out of business. An equally importantthreat is that
the remaining brokers will become increasingly concentratedin the tradi-
tional major financial centers. The demise of the regional exchangeswould
be both a reflection of this concentration and, perhapsto some degree, a
cause.
It can be argued, with considerable validity, that the dramatic growth of
institutional investors has made individualsa less important source of new
capital and consequently, that a distributionsystem with outlets in every
nook and cranny of the country isunnecessary. But even with the
importance of institutions, there will betimes when they are not in the
market and individuals becomea disproportionately important source of
funds; an example is the distributionprimarily to individuals of the Southern
Company's issue of preferred stock, in fall1 974, which was made through a
very large syndicate of brokers. Moreover, thereare reasons to believe that
certain institutions will in the future chooseto invest a relatively smdller
fraction of their new funds inequities in general and the equities of nesvly
I
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emerging firms in particular. The recently enacted pension fund legislation
may well havethe dual effects of making debt securitiesrelatively more
attractive than equities as investments for pension funds and okonceiitrating
the funds' attention on the equities of the larger, wellestablisheti firms. II this
is the case, the individual investor will become an increasingly important
source of capital for newly emerging firms, and a distribution system that can
serve individualseifectivel' will be crucial to the effective functioningof the
capital markets.
There is nothing in this argument which suggests that a network of
regional exchanges and brokerage firms will not surviveit they are
economically justified and required to make the capital markets function
effectively. For this reason,I do not join others who have argued that
regional exchanges and brokerages should in some way be subsidized
(e.g., by the continuation of fixed minimum commissions). But by the same
token, they should not be placed at a competitive disadvantage, particu-
larly as the structure of the central market system develops. Several of the
recent initiatives of the New York and American exchanges can be
interpreted as attempting to do just that. I hope that such attempts continue
to meet with regulatory opposition, so that the regional exchanges have a
fair chance to survive,if indeed their survival is justified by economic
realities.
THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY REFORMS ON THE
REGIONAL EXCHANGES
Morris Mendelson
The consolidated tape (CTS) and consolidated quotation (CQS) systems will
give the regional exchanges greater exposure. How significant this expo-
sure will be remains to be seen. News of large trades isquickly dissemi-
nated now throughout the industry, even in the absence of a consolidated
tape. Smaller trades obviously will get more exposure.However, if the
consolidated tape is to affect the regional exchangessignificantly and
positively, it will have to transmit a kind of information thatindicates that
regional markets are frequently better than the NYSE market. However,it is
not clear how a tape can indicate which market is"better." A regional
execution at a higher price than the last trade on theprimary market might
suggest that the regional exchange is providing abetter market for sellers,
but certainly not for buyers. The opposite will be trueif the regional
execution is lower.
While decline may be expected in trades inwhich the principals are428 F'ostsc ripts by AcademicParticipants
attempting to avoid publicity and in trades executed forreciprocity, a
certain amount of skepticism about these declines iswarranted. In regard
to the first, the gossip network appears to bequite efficient; in regard to the
second, the NASD membership discountwas supposed to kill regional
trading, but there islittle evidence that it has had much effect.
The effect of implementation of theCQS may be quite different. Thereis
currently no efficient medium for disseminatingregional quotes. It should
be clearly understood that the abilityof regional exchangesto attract
orders will not dependon their maintaining narrower spreads thantheir
competitors; it will depend on their posting betterprices on one or the
other side of the market. Itis tempting to think that theadvantage of
competitive market making is that each marketmaker is forced tomaintain
narrower spreads. But that is not the only advantage.When thereare
multiple market makers, it becomespossible (and the more marketmakers
there are, the more probableit becomes) that oneor more of them will
have a long position and thatone or more others will have a shortposition. Under such conditionswe should expect to find those in longPositions making the better offers andthose in short positions supplyingthe better bids. The combinationof high bid and low offermay constitute a narrower
spread than is provided byany single market maker. The criticalfactors in
determining whether regionalspecialists will offer significantcompetition will be whether they doin fact provide better priceson at least one side of the market and whetherthey are ready to providesignificant depth.
All the above createsa chicken-egg problem. Regionalspecialists can
supply the depth only if theyare exposed to a sufficient flow of orders,and they will be so exposedonly if they supply the depth.However, in considering this problemone factor cannot be overlooked. Thefortunes of the regionals are linkedto the fortune of the NYSE. Howthe NYSE is likely to fare in the new environmentmust, therefore, be explored.
The combined reformsare highly likely to damage the viabilityof the NYSE as a trading floor. Thisdamage is likely tocome from the spread of market making,some exodus of member firms,' andthe loss of some of the
most effective specialists. Followingare some of the factors thatcan cause a number of firms to drift intoupstairs market making: (1)net trading is an efficient method of avoidingthe problem of whethercompetitors will follow if a firmposts changes in commissionrates; (2) institutional traders frequently want directaccess to market makers; and(3) market making can be quite profitable.
Posting rates forinstitutionalsized ordersposes problems. In the com-
petitive environment thatis likely to prevail,rates of competitive firmsare likely to be thesame, and it will be difficultto adjust rates to changes in the market environmentAll firms will haveto assess the current interest in trading and the probableflow of orders andthen set their rates accordingly.postscripts by Academic Participants
In institutional trading it is unlikely that any trading firm willbe able to
raise rates until all trading firms have arrived at a similarassessment of the
situation, Unless some firm acquires the role of price leader(at the risk of
exposure to antitrust prosecution), the process of adjustingrates may
become cumbersome and slow. The most likely solutionto the problem
will be a move to institutional trading on a net basis.
After May 1, 1975, the pressure on trading firmsto become market
makers probably will intensify. The pressure on trading firmsto engage in
dealer activity already is evident in the activity ofmajor firms such as
Salomon Brothers and Goldman, Sachs. These dealersalready indicate
interest on both sides of the market on many stocks. in suchstocks and in
AutEx they stand ready to supply quotes on either side of themarket on
request.
If the regime of competitive rates is extended tointramember rates, the
chances are great that the leading trading firms will withdrawfrom the
NYSE. There would be little reason for them to remain because theycould
simply negotiate contracts with floor brokers to execute the ordersthey
want to send to the floor.
The spread of market making would be damaging to the specialist. The
logical strategy for the well-financed and competent specialist will beto go
into general market making, or at the very least to insist on the elimination
of NYSE Rule 113, which prohibitsolicitation of orders from institutions.
Specialists are handicapped by Rule 11 3 in trying to lay off takedowns.
This in turn limits their ability to compete with block positioners and
competing market makers. Specialists, however, have the advantage (in
effect, the subsidy) of floor brokerage from agency orders. Major trading
firms thus subsidize the specialists' market making. Rule 113 had a
two.fold purpose. The first was to avoid a conflict of interest in which the
specialist acts as agent for his own customers and for the customers of
other member firms. The second was as a quid pro quo for Rule 394, 50
that rules 113 and 394 in combination became in effect an agreement
between specialist and member firms that the specialist would not attempt
to reach out and deal with the customers of member firms directly and that
the member firms in turn would bring their orders to the floor of the
exchange. A recall of either rule would put specialists in direct competition
with member firms. Specialists fear that with such competition many firms
would be unwilling to remain members and, in effect, subsidize their own
competition. A recall of one rule will generate pressure to recall the other.
The NYSE thus seems in danger of losing its dominant position in the
market. If it allows specialists to compete with its major members, those
members will be tempted to resign;ifit does not allow specialists to
compete, the better ones will be tempted to leave the NYSE. Such an
exodus would greatly affect the NYSE.
429The spread of market making clearly means that a number of orderswill
no longer reach the floor. These include principal trades ol the member
firms, orders for execution at the opening (and some at the close),and
many not-held orders. Of course, the relocation of most executions is
subject to any price priority rule that may be promulgated. Thedeflection
of trading will undoubtedly affect the specialist's market-makingpotential
in three ways:
It will reduce his income;
It will reduce the flow of orders against which he can lay off his
position; and
It will cause some loss of his economic intelligence.
Items 2 and 3 require some elaboration. Insofaras the member firm
engages in principal trades as a market maker, it obviously absorbssome of
the orders against which the specialist might have laid offhis own position.
Insofar as the member firm matches ordersat the opening or the close of
the market, the specialist is hardly deprived of lay-offpotential, nor does
this type of matching createany trading imbalance on the floor. The
possibility of not being exposed to not-held orders,however, does affect
his lay-off potential.
The specialist's information set is not affectedby the simple matching of
orders upstairs. Such matches will bereported immediately, and the
information will be available toeveryone. His information set will be
diminished by loss ofawareness of some not-held orders. Finally,every
market maker and dealer isan inquiry center. The larger the number of
such centers that exist, the smallerthe fraction of total informationavail-
able to any one center.
With these considerations in mind,we can return to the question of the
kind of markets the regionalsare likely to provide, lithe future of regional
specialists looks promising,new and more venturesome capitalmay be-
come available to them. At least forsome stocks, the NYSE specialists
would be hard to compete with, Ifleading specialists leave theNYSE in
accordance with the scenario above,the relative position of the regional
specialists will be improved.
The extent ofexposure of regional specialists will dependin part on the
nature of the auction trading rule theSEC eventually promulgates andon
the nature of the routing devicethat is eventually usedto implement that
rule. There are two possiblerouting devices: a Centaurcomponent and a
NASDAQ component. Bothsystems would permit firms to select theirown routing algorithms. However,a Centaur-based system will undoubtedly
vigorously resist algorithms thatdo not send ordersto the NYSE floor in the
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aDSeflCe of better prices elsewhere or of specific Overriding
instructions.
Even so, most firms are likely to direct small orders to the bestmarket they
can conveniently transmit them to. By the time arouting systemis operative, a national clearing System also will be fullyoperative, so the
cost of clearing through the clearing corporationassociated with an
exchange will not affect the decision as to wherea trade should be
executed. Most firms undoubtedly will send routinetrades to the best
market that obtains at the time and will prefer a "local"exchange to one in
another region when the quotes are identical. Thatprobably will be
cheaper for them. Frequently this may turn out to bea third-market firm
rather than any exchange.
Intermediate orders may be more widely deployed.The exposure that
the CQS provides for regional specialists will surely result ina larger flow
of inquiries,at leastinitially.This will be the testing period forthe
regionals.If they provide depth, the flow of inquiriesprobably will
continue and even increase. If they fail, the flow of inquiries willdry up.
This brings us back to the chicken-egg problem.
The consolidated tape and quotation systems may create investordiscon-
tent. Consolidated tapes do not show the best market; they show only the
last trade. Brokers may be embarrassed by directing trades toone market
only to find that the next trade in the same or another market is better. It
this gives discontent, there will be considerable user pressure to accelerate
the implementation of the CQS.
The CQS will enable a broker to identify the best market as of a moment.
A CQS will nevertheless give rise to two problems: the best market chosen
for the execution of an order may no longer be the best market when the
order arrives, and routing to the best market entails a severe mechanical
problem. The first may be alleviated by solution of the second. If each firm
has to solve its own routing problem, there will be a strong temptation
simply to route to the primary market. Itis not clear that firms with large
volumes will have any other options. Under the circumstances,itis
doubtful that the SEC will press a price priority rule. It may piously voice it,
but it probably will not seriously attempt to enforce such a rule except in
the face of gross violations.
That there will be an industry solution to the routing problem is much
more likely. A routing device is one of the componentsplanned for
Centaur. It will permit firms to select their own routing algorithm and can
be installed by mid-1976. The only thing that delays installation is the
difficulty of getting firms to agree on message content. The Centaur routing
device would permit orders to be directed to any exchange or tothe
NASDAQ system, and routing within the latter to the appropriatemarket
maker would be made by NASDAQ. No routing delays areanticipated




within the NASDAQsystem. If NASDAQ can do thispart of the job, itcan do the whole jobat a comparatively minor marginalinvestment. Once the industryrouting system is developed andimplemented, the price priority rulecan be substantially implemented byregulatory approval of the algorithms. Withoutautomated execution, however,there is asyet no guarantee that the marketto which an order is directed willstill be the best one when itarrives. However, except when thereis heavy tradingin a stock, itis unlikely that the bestmarket will be missed.
The speed with whichautomated execution is developedwill dependon how the NYSE fares.Centaur's time frame calls fora fully automated central market, includingcompletely locked-in trades,to be in operation before 1980.NASDAQ's horizon isno further away. lithe NYSEdoes not fare well and theauction market is impaired,the SEC and possiblythe industry will push hardfor earlier implementatio,
Since the contours ofa central market with aconsolidated book and automated executionsare difficult to foresee at thisearly stage, it is hardto tell how theregionals eventually will fare.Itis, however, difficultto see how any exchangecan play an important role inthe tradingarena with automated executions
I visualjz threepossible types ofconsolidated books:a federated system in which electronicbooks maintained bythe regionalsare linked by an automatic routing system,a monolithic system in whichthere is a single electronic book, anda unitary system in whichthere are a numbero' electronic books but theorders and quotes forany particular stockappear in one book only.In the federatedsystem, orders forany particular stock can appear in any andall books. Theregionals have a roleto play in a federated system, butit is clearly the leastefficient of the three,Indeed, it may turn out to bean electronic nightmare.
A monolithicsystem poses pricingproblems andseems to lack incen- tives for remainingtechnologicallyup to date. Thesedifficulties may possibly beovercome by Periodicallysubmitting theprocessorship to competitive bidding. Theunitary systemappears to be the mostattractive. We may hope thatif a givenprocessor iallowed to handleonly one book, the books willcompete for listings.




This symposiuni has dealt with a great deal more thanregional stock
exchanges. It has been a conference on the future ofa central market system
Hundreds of questions were raised, but even more interestingquestions were
not. One of the most important for the future of competition insecurities
markets is, How will the SEC be affected by a cntral marketsystem? One of
the most disturbing possibilities is that Dr. Frankenstein will haveno control
over his monster. And historically, the responsibility of control has not rested
well in the hands of government regulatory agencies. Will theSEC have the
jampot thrust into its hands by Congress? If so, how will the SEC bechanged?
The participants at the symposium were carefully chosen.There was
representation from brokerage houses, market makers,commercial banks,
government, investment banking, and the academic world. Jokingly,the
conferees were split into real-world participants (definedas those who
have jobs and capital at stake) and unreal-world participants(lawyers,
regulators, and academics). As an unreal-world academician withno
particular ox to be gored,I would like to review the history ofevents
preceding the current securities legislation before I speculateon the future
of the SEC.
Organization of the Marketplace
One of the important features of a central market system is the proposed
elimination of fixed minimum brokerage commissions on May 1, 1975.
Actually, the elimination of fixed rates began in the 1960s with the
development of high-volume institutional trading. As time wore on the
monopsonistic power of institutional traders forced exchange members to
give up a portion of their inflated commissions in one way or another.
Apparently between 40 and 80 percent of the supposedly fixed commis-
sions were remitted.In 1968 the SEC eliminated give-ups. However,
abolishing give-ups did not solve the problem, since the various purposes
served by give-ups were quickly supplanted by "regular-way reciprocity,"
"institutionalmembership,""four-waytickets,"andotherevasive
mechanisms. Rate competition was here to stay.
Coincident with the abolition of give-ups, volume discounts were insti-
tuted on securities exchanges. This history of events certainly did not hurt
the regional exchanges. Between 1962 and 1968 the NYSE lost 12 percentS
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of its volume to the thirdmarket and regionalexchanges.4 By1971 off-board trading in NYSEstocks amounted tomore than 26 percentof dollar volumeon the exchange.5 Although theissue is clouded bymany factors, my guess is that thetrend away from the NYSEwill not bereversed by fully negotiatedcommission rates. There is littlemotivation for institu- tional traders locatedin Chicago, for example,to set up in New Yorkif they can find similarservices and obtainaccess through the MidwestStock Exchange to a nationalmarket system at comparablecost at home. Thereis little reason forEuropean traders to deal withNew York instead ofBoston if, by takinga trade to Boston, theyare provided access to "the"mar- ketplace. For these andother reasons the "regional"exchanges willnot be driven out of businessby competitive commissionrates.
Another problemsuggested at the symposiumwas that the eliminationof fixed minimumcommissions mightcause research services toatrophy. This effect is not necessarilybad. To the extentthat nonpricecompetition has encouraged superfluousresearch, its eliminationwill improve thewelfare of investors.However, information isnot without value.Value Line and Moody's Handbookwill not likelydisappear.Itis not impossibleto separate brokerage fromresearch services andto price them independ- ently.
Another issue isNYSE membershipor even the value ofowning a seat on any organized exchange.After all, one ofthe purposes ofhaving an exchange is torestrict entry into themarketplace. Thisrestricted entry provides anopportunity formonopolistic profits, andthe discountedvalue of the monopolist'srent is the marketvalue of a seat. Itis tempting toargue that because offully negotiatedrates and unrestrictedentry to a central market system themonopoly rents willbe eliminated andthe price ofan exchange seat willfall to zero. HaroldDemsetz pointedout at 1968 SEC hearings thatcompetitive commissionrates would not reducethe number of seats in theexchange, merelythe price ofa seat. Seymour Smidtgave the reasonat this symposium.Any marketplaceexists, at least inpart, because of externaleconomies of scale.You oftensee the phenomenon of an art walk, a jewelers'row, or a restaurantlane. These highlycompetitive businessesgroup together ina small area becausesuppliers can sendone truck to thearea, or because buyersknow whereto go. Thesesame external economiesexist for theexecution, clearing,and retail operations of major stockexchanges. Theuse of exchangemembership is simplya device tocapture the renton these external
economies. Therefore,I believe thatcompetitivecommissions willreduce themonopoly profits of NYSE members butwill not reducethe price ofa seat to zero becauseof the value of therent on the external
economies of scalewhich exchange membershipcaptures.6
IFuture Changes in the SEC
In addition to theelimination of fixed minimum brokerage commission
rates there are three other main elements of the central market system: (1)
implementation of a composite tape, (2) implementation of composite
quotations, and (3) development of a more efficient, national, post.trade
clearing system.
Questions concerning the composite tape and composite quotations can
be handled together. Should there be competing tape and quote systems or
can an argument bemade for natural monopoly? Who willpay for the
systems? Who will monitor access to them? Who will decide which stocks
are listed ordelisted? Where? Must all trades be quotedeven those
netted against each other in the back rooms of odd-lot houses? Exactly
what will go into the composite quotation system? Will it be simply bid
and asked prices? Will number of shares be published? Will the name or
identifying number of the trader be published? Will limit and stop orders
be published?
These and other questions are critical in determining the type of central
market system that will emerge. The NYSE will not be able to extend its
self-regulatory function to other exchanges and to the third market. This
was made crystal clear at the symposium. The arbiter of disputes and the
party toward whom questions were directed most often was the representa-
tive of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
I am convinced that the major effect of the central market system will
not be to make securities markets more competitive. That end had almost
been accomplished anywaythrough the growth of the third market,
regional exchanges, and institutional investors, and through the system of
give-ups. The SEC has acted only after the fact.Its function has been
mainly to make competition more equitable.
A major impact of the central market system that appears to have been
overlooked by the symposium's participants, however, is the strong possi-
bility that pending legislation and other legacies of the struggle to obtain a
central market system may change the fundamental character of the
Securities and Exchange Commission by thrusting the jampot into its
hands. Arbitration of disputes regarding the need for uniform rules and
regulations among competing market centers almost surely will be required
of the SEC. Nho else could decide what goes into the composite quote,
who will gain access to the tape and quote, what companies will be lasted
there, and whether or not all trades will be reported? These decisions
amount to more than negative prerogatives. For the first time the Securities
and Exchange Commission will have, and realize that it has, something of
value to give or withhold. It will have the jampot.
Postscripts by Academic Participants 435436
Postscripts by Academic - '- Participants
NOTIS
Unless the contextindicates otherwise the phrase"member firms" refersto meni of the NYSE and doesnot include firms thatare members of regional
exchanges only. In the SEC white
paper, "Policy Statement of theSecurities and Exchange
Commission on the Structure ofa Central Market System"
(March 29, 1973), two basictrading 'Uleswere proposed, One, designatedthe "auction tradingrule," would providePrice priority protection for all public orders
throughout the system. Theterm "price priorityrule" is an alternative designationof the auction tradingrule and has theadvantage of beingmore descriptive of itscontent
Alfreij E. Kahn, TheEconomics of Regulation:
Issues (New York:Wiley 1971), p. 196.
Ibid., OP. 195-196.
SEC, Annual Report(1971) and SEC,Statistical Bulletin,February 1972, March1972; "NYSE CompetjtjPosition," NYSE SpecialMembership BulletinFebruary JO, 1971 Donald E.Farrar, "The ComingReform on Wall Street."Harvard BusinessReview, SeptemberOctober 1972;and Farrar, "Towarda Central Market System:Wall Street's Slow Retreat Into theFuture," Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative
Analysis November 1974, p. 818,n. J3.
Although it is not clearwhy, it is interestingto note that the difference
between the price of a NYSE seatand a seat onone of the "regional"
exchanges has decreaseduntil the difference today isonly about $45,000,The decreasingdifference may reflecterosion of the monopolyrent which can beexpected from a NYSEseat.